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Combating Inaccuracies in Criminal 
Background Checks by Giving Meaning 
to the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s workplace, employers are either highly 
incentivized or legally mandated to ensure that they have 
knowledge of an employee’s criminal record. As a result, an 
overwhelming majority of employers now require criminal 
background checks as a condition of employment,1 and millions 
of these checks are performed each year.2 Such checks are 
especially prevalent in the midst of today’s gripping recession, 
  
 1 A 2010 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management found that 
73 percent of employers conduct criminal background checks on all job candidates, 
while an additional 19 percent conduct criminal background checks on select job 
candidates. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/ 
Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundCheckCriminalChecks.aspx. When 
asked for their primary reasons for conducting criminal background checks, respondents 
answered as follows: “to ensure a safe work environment for employees” (61 percent); 
“to reduce legal liability for negligent hiring” (55 percent); “to reduce/prevent theft and 
embezzlement, other criminal activity” (39 percent); “to comply with applicable state 
law requiring a background check (e.g. daycare teachers, licensed medical 
practitioners, etc.) for a particular position” (20 percent); “to assess the overall 
trustworthiness of the job candidate” (12 percent); “other” (4 percent). Id. (noting that 
“[p]ercentages do not total to 100% as respondents were allowed multiple choices”).  
 2 According to a 2008 ABC News investigation, “There has been a surge in 
interest in criminal background checks in the last 15 years. Private companies conduct 
millions of such checks a year.” Scott Michels, Advocates Complain of Background 
Check Errors, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/ 
story?id=6017227&page=1. “[E]mployers are relying increasingly on privately 
maintained criminal history records.” Michael H. Jagunic, Comment, The Unified 
“Sealed” Theory: Updating Ohio’s Record-Sealing Statute for the Twenty-First Century, 
59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 161, 170 (2011). Although “comprehensive, industry-wide data are 
not available,” one CRA alone, “ChoicePoint[,] reported that it conducted 
approximately 3.3 million background investigations during 2002, the vast majority of 
which included a criminal justice information component.” SEARCH: NAT’L 
CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE 
ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION 7 (2005), available at 
http://search.org/files/pdf/rntfcscjri.pdf [hereinafter SEARCH].  
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which has truly “transformed the employment application 
process into a survival of the fittest.”3 
In general, information relating to arrests, convictions, 
and other court proceedings is a matter of public record.4 
Rather than search these records themselves, employers solicit 
consumer reporting agencies (CRAs)5 to provide them with 
consumer reports about potential employees, containing, 
among other things, information about criminal records.6 
Employers ultimately base their hiring decisions in part on the 
information contained in these consumer reports.7 Not 
  
 3 Roberto Concepción, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: Effectuating 
Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and 
Business Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523, 524 (2010). 
 4 In the seminal case on this matter, Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court 
denied a claim alleging that publicizing an arrest record was a violation of 
constitutional privacy rights. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). The Court definitively stated 
that the petitioner’s case was based “on a claim that the State may not publicize a 
record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions 
hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner,” thereby 
closing the door on any future proceedings attempting to extend constitutional privacy 
protection to criminal records. Id.; see generally Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process 
and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2009) 
(providing an overview and critique of the persistence of Paul v. Davis and its progeny).  
 5 Under the FCRA, 
[t]he term “consumer reporting agency” means any person which, for monetary 
fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in 
part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or 
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports 
to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for 
the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.  
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2006). In some of the cases discussed in this note, CRAs are 
referred to as credit reporting agencies. For all intents and purposes, these are the 
same as consumer reporting agencies. Credit reports and consumer reports are 
interchangeable terms as well.  
 6 Under the FCRA, 
[t]he term “consumer report” means any written, oral, or other communication of 
any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit 
worthiness [creditworthiness], credit standing, credit capacity, character, 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or 
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a 
factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . (B) employment 
purposes . . . . 
Id. § 1681a(d)(1) (footnote omitted). “[C]riminal histories fall under the purview of the 
FCRA . . . [b]ecause a criminal history touches on an applicant’s ‘character, general 
reputation, or personal characteristics’ . . . .” Christopher M.A. Lujan, Using Criminal 
Histories to Make Sound Hiring Decisions, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 57, 58.  
 7 However, in making such decisions, employers must be careful not to 
violate “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF 
ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/ 
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surprisingly, “research unequivocally demonstrates that having a 
criminal record greatly reduces one’s employment opportunities.”8 
For this system to have any value, consumer reports 
must be accurate and up to date; a flawed consumer report can 
have adverse consequences for both the job-seeking 
consumer9—who loses a conditional offer of employment—and 
the employer—who rescinds an offer from a potentially 
valuable and otherwise qualified employee.10 In 1970, Congress 
recognized the “vital role”11 that CRAs play in this system and 
enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)12 to regulate the 
production and use of consumer reports.13 To accomplish this 
goal, the FCRA regulates the information that can be included 
  
guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE]; see Title VII, codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (2006); see also Robb Mandelbaum, U.S. Push on Illegal Bias 
Against Hiring Those with Criminal Records, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, at B8. To 
avoid Title VII liability, an employer must be able to show that denial of employment 
based on a criminal record was consistent with business necessity; that it considered 
three factors: “the nature and gravity of the offense(s), . . . the time that has passed 
since the [conviction] and/or completion of the sentence; and [t]he nature of the job held 
or sought.” EEOC GUIDANCE, supra. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), “[a] policy or practice that excludes everyone with a criminal 
record from employment will not be job related and consistent with business necessity 
[as required by statute] and therefore will violate Title VII, unless it is required by 
federal law.” EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT 
THE EEOC’S ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND 
CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII (2006), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Even where an employer develops a screening system that 
considers these three factors, the EEOC suggests that an individualized assessment of 
any excluded applicants will further insulate the employer from Title VII liability. 
EEOC GUIDANCE, supra (listing factors that should be considered in an individualized 
assessment). Further, the EEOC treats arrests and convictions differently, as “[a]rrests 
are not proof of criminal conduct.” Id. Therefore, “an arrest record standing alone may 
not be used to deny an employment opportunity, [but] an employer may make an 
employment decision based on the conduct underlying the arrest if the conduct makes 
the individual unfit for the position in question.” Id. 
 8 Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a 
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People 
with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 21 (2005). 
 9 In the context of this note, the consumer will almost always be a 
prospective employee. Therefore, this note will use the term employee and consumer 
interchangeably. 
 10 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES 6 
(Apr. 2012), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-
report.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.]. A consumer report can be flawed 
in two ways: it can attribute an erroneous criminal record to an individual or it can 
report an individual’s criminal record in a flawed manner. In the latter instance, the 
report may contain information relating to an expunged matter or it may fail to state 
an ultimate disposition of the matter that was favorable to the consumer. 
 11 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2006). 
 12 Id. § 1681 et seq. 
 13 Id. § 1681(b). 
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in consumer reports14 and the users with whom that 
information can be shared.15 In the employment context, before 
CRAs can prepare a report for an employer, the FCRA also 
requires disclosure to consumers and their written consent.16 
The FCRA mandates that CRAs employ mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with its provisions. In § 1681e(b), the 
statute requires that CRAs use “reasonable procedures to 
assure maximum possible accuracy” when preparing any 
consumer report.17 In the employment context, § 1681k places 
heightened compliance requirements on CRAs when consumer 
reports are created using public records. When such a report is 
“likely to have an adverse effect” on an employment decision, 
CRAs must either notify the consumer at the time they send 
the report to the employer or “maintain strict procedures 
designed to insure that [the information reported] is complete 
and up to date.”18 
The FCRA creates a private right of action for injured 
consumers, intended in part as one means of enforcing the 
statute.19 Yet, the FCRA is not a strict liability statute. Instead, 
it provides for liability only in cases of negligent or willful 
noncompliance.20 Thus, an injured consumer’s only recourse 
against a CRA is to bring a cause of action and prove elements 
similar to those of a traditional tort claim: that the CRA 
engaged in a negligent or willful breach of a duty imposed by 
the FCRA, which proximately caused the consumer’s injury.21  
However, due to the FCRA’s general lack of guidance 
with respect to its requirements, injured consumers and courts 
have struggled to impose liability on CRAs for violating the 
statute. Forty years of extensive litigation has produced little 
clarity as to the types of procedures required for CRA compliance. 
  
 14 Id. § 1681c. 
 15 Id. § 1681b.  
 16 Id. § 1681b(b)(2). 
 17 Id. § 1681e(b). 
 18 Id. § 1681k(a).  
 19 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o. Negligent violation of the statute entitles plaintiffs 
to recover actual damages, while willful violation allows for recovery of both statutory 
and punitive damages. Id.; see Williams v. LexisNexis Risk Mgmt., No. 3:06-cv-241, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62193, at *27-28 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2007) (holding that class 
certification could be permissible in a case alleging willful violation, even absent any 
claim for actual damages). In Safeco v. Burr, the Supreme Court held that a CRA 
willfully violates the FCRA when it acts in reckless disregard of the statutory 
requirements. 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). 
 21 Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (noting 
that “[t]he standard of conduct by which the agency’s action is to be judged is deeply 
rooted in the law of negligence”).  
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And although the FCRA, in § 1681k, purports to impose a 
heightened standard on CRAs when furnishing criminal 
background reports for employment purposes, these problems 
still persist. Further, § 1681k contains an enigmatic provision 
allowing CRAs to “opt-out” of its heightened standards (by 
sending contemporaneous notice to consumers), while providing 
no corresponding enhancement of consumer protection.22 
Therefore, while private litigation may have been intended as a 
way to enforce the FCRA’s goal of ensuring accuracy in the 
reporting industry, the reality of engaging in protracted litigation 
often presents an insurmountable hurdle for consumers seeking 
relief, and, even then, only after they have been injured by 
erroneous reports. By amending § 1681k to require that CRAs 
provide consumers with a copy of their purported criminal 
records before distributing the report to prospective employers, 
Congress could solve many of these problems and give meaning 
to the heightened requirements of § 1681k.  
The rest of this note is divided into five parts. Part I 
explores some of the reasons why employers conduct criminal 
background checks and identifies some of the dangers that 
over-reliance on these reports poses to consumers, especially in 
light of documented inaccuracies.23 Part II provides an 
introduction to the FCRA, its purpose, and some of its relevant 
provisions. Part III analyzes the requirements for proving a 
violation of the general compliance procedures contained in 
§ 1681e(b), illustrating the current legal framework’s inadequacies 
in providing meaningful relief to injured consumers. Part IV 
explores the supposed heightened compliance requirements of 
§ 1681k and shows how that section fails to meaningfully 
  
 22 See infra Part IV.C. 
 23 In a report issued in April 2012, the National Consumer Law Center 
(NCLC) found that “evidence indicates that professional background screening 
companies routinely make mistakes with grave consequences for job seekers.” NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 3. The report documented the many types of 
mistakes found in these reports and their causes, and also addressed some of the same 
legal issues raised in this note. See generally id. In response to the NCLC report, the 
National Association of Professional Background Screeners issued a press release 
denouncing the report’s findings and claiming that “[o]f the small number of reports 
that are disputed by a consumer, more than 95 percent are ultimately found to be 
accurate.” Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Background Screeners, Background 
Screening Industry Denounces NCLC Report (June 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/6/prweb9603002.htm. It is not the intention of 
this note to join in this empirical debate concerning whether or not inaccuracies are 
rampant in the background screening industry. Instead, given that it is undisputed 
that some inaccurate criminal background reports are produced, this note focuses on 
improving the means of recourse available for consumers injured by such reports and 
offers a legislative suggestion to improve accuracy overall.  
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enhance consumer protection—in large part because the 
FCRA’s ex-post approach provides consumers an opportunity to 
identify mistakes in their reports only after the damage has 
been done. Finally, Part V suggests that amending § 1681k to 
require that reports be provided to consumers before being 
supplied to potential employers can ameliorate many of private 
litigation’s failures in FCRA enforcement. 
I. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT: THE 
GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UNRELIABLE 
A. The Use of Criminal Background Checks Protects Society 
and Employers 
There are many reasons why employers conduct 
criminal background checks of prospective employees, but 
those reasons all share a central theme: the recognition that 
certain positions have the potential to be used as a means of 
inflicting harm—either against the employer or the public.24 In 
some instances, employers are mandated to conduct these 
checks by a wide range of state and federal laws prohibiting the 
employment of people with criminal records in certain fields, 
such as the healthcare, financial services, trucking, and 
community care facility industries.25 
  
 24 Lujan, supra note 6, at 57 (“[I]f there is a high probability that an employee 
will interact frequently with the public or handle valuable property, a prudent employer 
will obtain a criminal history and analyze the relationship between the criminal conduct 
and the position sought before determining if hiring is appropriate.”); see also supra note 
1. While this note focuses on CRA responsibilities and liabilities when providing criminal 
background in consumer reports, the FCRA also regulates the use of that information by 
user-employers. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m. For an in-depth discussion of employer 
responsibilities when soliciting criminal background checks from CRAs, see generally 
Susan Gardner et al., Does Your Background Checker Put You in Jeopardy?: A Case for 
Best Practices and Due Diligence, 11 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 111 (2008).  
 25 Aukerman, supra note 8, at 23; Gardner et al., supra note 24, at 118; 
James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177-78 (2008). The 
requirement of a license for certain jobs poses problems as well. According to a 2006 
report by the New York State Bar Association,  
Over 100 occupations in New York State require some type of license, 
registration, or certification by a state agency. Although only a few statutes 
automatically bar people from licensure solely based on past convictions, New 
York places many statutory restrictions based on an individual’s criminal history 
through general “good moral character” requirements for almost all licenses. For 
example, an individual with a criminal conviction cannot obtain a license to 
work as a barber because “a criminal history indicates a lack of good moral 
character and trustworthiness required for licensure.” 
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Even where criminal background checks are not 
required by law, many employers will demand them as a 
condition of employment. Employers tend to view those with 
criminal records as untrustworthy or unreliable.26 Additionally, 
the state law doctrine of negligent hiring liability provides a 
large incentive for employers to insist on conducting criminal 
background checks.27 Under this doctrine, “[a]n employer may 
be liable for negligently hiring employees when such negligence 
results in harm to third parties, even when the harm inflicted 
by the employee occurs outside the scope of employment . . . .”28 
Thus, “a direct duty running from the employer to those 
members of the public whom the employer might reasonably 
anticipate would be placed in a position of risk of injury as the 
result of the hiring” is imposed.29 An employer can be liable if 
he “knew or should have known” of an employee’s propensities 
towards criminal acts.30 To avoid potential liability, an 
employer’s “safest course of action sometimes appears to be 
automatically disqualifying applicants with criminal 
histories . . . .”31 As one writer put it, “many companies [have] 
  
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 60-61 (2006), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Substantive_Reports&ContentID=1141
5&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm [hereinafter STATE BAR REPORT] (quoting Clyde 
Haberman, He Did Time, So He’s Unfit to Do Hair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at B1).  
 26 See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal 
Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 390 (2006). 
 27 Gardner et al., supra note 24, at 111 (“[W]ith the upsurge in negligent 
hiring and retention lawsuits, employers [have] continued their prevention efforts by 
checking the qualifications and backgrounds of prospective and current employees.”); 
Lujan, supra note 6, at 57 (“Having this information before a hiring decision is made 
can help in defending the employer against negligent hiring or supervision claims.”); 
STATE BAR REPORT, supra note 25, at 83. “Virtually all states have recognized a cause 
of action in tort for persons injured by an employer’s negligence in hiring, retaining or 
supervising a dangerous employee.” 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 10.01 
(MB 2012); see also Katherine A. Peebles, Note, Negligent Hiring and the Information 
Age: How State Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable Liability, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1397, 1404 (2012) (“Every state recognizes the tort of negligent hiring.”).  
 28 Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: 
Navigating Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 376 (1997). 
To be successful, “a plaintiff must establish that (1) the employer owed the third party 
a duty of reasonable care, (2) the employer breached the duty[,] and (3) the breach 
proximately caused the third party’s harm.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 29 Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 n.5 (Minn. 1983). 
 30 Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking A Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public 
Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1301 (2002) 
(emphasis added). 
 31 Id. at 1302.  
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adopted Ben Franklin’s adage, ‘an ounce of prevention is worth 
a pound of cure.’”32  
B. Over-Reliance on Criminal Background Checks Hurts 
Offenders and Society 
While criminal background checks can help employers 
avoid liability, overzealous reliance on this information leads to 
an unfounded bias against individuals with criminal records. In 
theory, “[t]he law conducts a balancing test between the 
employer’s right to maintain an environment free from criminal 
behavior and providing individuals with a criminal history the 
opportunity to work.”33 However, critics of mandated proscription 
from certain jobs34 and proponents of limiting negligent hiring 
liability feel that these practices create an insurmountable 
obstacle for people who have criminal records.35 As a result, 
while “background screening can be helpful in identifying 
applicants whose records makes [sic] them unsuitable for a 
particular position . . . , such screening also discloses records 
which should not be disqualifying, but which, in practice, are 
treated as disqualifying by employers.”36 High recidivism rates 
have been attributed in part to the difficulty of obtaining 
meaningful employment with a criminal record,37 and it has been 
suggested that “[r]ehabilitation through employment 
opportunities is one clear way to stem the tide of ex-offenders 
leaving and re-entering society through the jailhouse doors.”38 
  
 32 Gardner et al., supra note 24, at 111 (quoting Benjamin Franklin, c. 1736). 
 33 Lujan, supra note 6, at 60.  
 34 One such critique of “[r]ecord based employment disqualifications [is that 
they] are imposed by operation of law, without any consideration of their 
appropriateness for the individual involved.” Aukerman, supra note 8, at 25. 
 35 “Despite the protections afforded by federal and state law, a demonstrated 
preference for hiring people without criminal records still exists.” STATE BAR REPORT, 
supra note 25, at 80; Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal 
Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2008) (stating that a criminal 
record can carry with it “a stigma so indelible as to subject even non-violent offenders to 
lifelong sentences”). “The more accessible these records, the more likely the stigma of a 
criminal conviction, or even an arrest, will endure.” Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 25, at 211. 
 36 Aukerman, supra note 8, at 23.  
 37 “Research from both academics and practitioners suggest that the chief 
factor which influences the reduction of recidivism is an individual’s ability to gain 
‘quality employment.’” STATE BAR REPORT, supra note 25, at 50 (citing, e.g., 
MEASURING RECIDIVISM: CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION’S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE, at 12 (May 2004), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism_General.pdf). 
 38 Leavitt, supra note 30, at 1282.  
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C. Accuracy Is Paramount, but Elusive  
Whether one agrees with the logic behind them or not, 
the reality is that criminal background checks are regularly 
performed. Assuming that these checks are important for 
employment decisions, it is clear that such reports should 
contain accurate and complete information. Unfortunately, 
“[n]o single source exists that provides complete and up-to-date 
information about a person’s criminal history.”39 Many 
employers, therefore, rely on information from “commercial 
databases[, which] are frequently inaccurate . . . .”40 Even 
information taken directly from courthouse computer systems 
can be unreliable, as “human errors, court delays, processing 
lags, and staffing shortages impair the quality of data.”41 
“Misspelled words, erroneous birthdates, and transposed 
address numbers can cause mis- or no information for the 
report.”42 As a result, courthouse “repositories are notorious for 
being ‘outdated, inaccurate and incomplete.’”43 
Yet, according to Craig Kessler, president of the CRA 
Backgroundchecks.com, “We’re not in the business of 
authenticating the identity of individuals. All we do is report 
the data that’s supplied to us from the courts.”44 This attitude 
has a direct effect on the accuracy of consumer reports, as 
illustrated by the experience of Ron Peterson. Peterson, a 
California resident, was denied employment based on an 
erroneous criminal report compiled by Backgroundchecks.com.45 
According to Peterson, “In Florida I’m a female prostitute 
(named Ronnie); in Texas I’m currently incarcerated for 
manslaughter . . . . In New Mexico I’m a dealer of stolen goods. 
  
 39 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL 
HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 6 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
olp/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT]; see also 
Gardner et al., supra note 24, at 119. 
 40 Gardner et al., supra note 24, at 119.  
 41 Id. at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 118 (quoting Jason B. Morris, Criminal Background Checks: You Get 
What You Pay For, VERIFIER (Background Info. Servs., Cleveland, Ohio) June/July 
2004, at 4, available at http://www.employeescreen.com/web/pdfs/verifier_issue3.pdf). 
“Misinformation can occur for a number of reasons—clerks mis-key information, 
criminal charges get dropped but not updated in files, or arrested suspects provide 
authorities with the name and Social Security number of someone else.” Kim Zetter, 
Bad Data Fouls Background Checks, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2005), http://www.wired.com/ 
politics/security/news/2005/03/66856?currentPage=all.  
 44 Zetter, supra note 43. 
 45 Id. 
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Oregon has me as a witness tamperer. And in Nevada—this is 
my favorite—I’m a registered sex offender.”46 
Peterson represents one type of consumer that can be 
hurt by an inaccurate or incomplete criminal background 
check: those who have never been arrested yet have a criminal 
history mistakenly ascribed to them. Inaccurate or incomplete 
reports can also harm individuals who were previously arrested 
or convicted of crimes because, while their charges might have 
been dropped or their records expunged, those records might 
still show up in a criminal background check.47 
There is currently no industry-wide data dealing 
directly with the accuracy of criminal record reports.48 However, 
a 2004 study by the National Association of State Public 
Interest Research Groups surveyed credit reports of adults in 
30 states.49 The study found that “[f]ifty-four percent (54%) of 
the credit reports contained personal demographic information 
that was misspelled, long-outdated, belonged to a stranger, or 
was otherwise incorrect[.]”50 The study also found that 
“[a]ltogether, 79% of the credit reports surveyed contained 
either serious errors or other mistakes of some kind.”51 At least 
one writer has opined that, “[g]iven that many of the same 
organizations conduct background and credit checks, errors in 
conducting one kind of check (credit) should make [us] 
similarly suspect of the accuracy of the other (background).”52 
Given how frequently criminal background checks are 
performed for employment purposes,53 the pervasiveness of 
such deficiencies poses a grave problem.54 In a recent class 
  
 46 Id. 
 47 “[C]ommercial databases may also be missing important disposition 
information that is relevant to a conviction record’s use for employment suitability 
purposes, such as sealing and expungement orders or entry into a pre-trial or post-trial 
diversion program.” ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 39, at 2. 
 48 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR, supra note 10, at 7; SEARCH, supra note 2, at 7.  
 49 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE PIRGS, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN 
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 4 (June 2004), available at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/ 
assets/BEevuv19a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Gardner et al., supra note 24, at 118; see also Zetter, supra note 43 (stating 
that “[t]here’s no reason to believe that criminal records are any more accurate” than 
credit reports).  
 53 See supra note 1. 
 54 According to a recent study, the current recession has not lead to a 
significant increase in the percentage of employers that conduct criminal background 
checks. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: GENERAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS 8 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/ 
Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Documents/Background%20Check_General.pptx. Still, 
it is safe to assume that with a constant rate of background checking, the increase in job 
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action lawsuit, 665,391 consumers brought a claim against the 
CRA HireRight, alleging that between 2004 and 2010 
HireRight failed to comply with the FCRA in the preparation of 
consumer reports, all of which contained adverse information 
about the consumers.55 And that is just a single case against a 
single agency. In fact, litigation for this issue continues.56 For 
these injured consumers, winning lawsuits depends on proving 
that the CRA violated the FCRA—the statute that was 
implemented to regulate this industry.  
II. FCRA—PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress 
recognized that “[c]onsumer reporting agencies [had] assumed 
a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and 
other information on consumers.”57 Even forty years ago, House 
Representative and FCRA sponsor Leonor Sullivan remarked:  
[W]ith the trend towards computerizations and billings and the 
establishment of all sorts of computerized data banks, the individual 
is in great danger of having his life and character reduced to 
impersonal “blips” and key-punch holes in a stolid and unthinking 
machine which can literally ruin his reputation without cause, and 
make him unemployable . . . .58 
Therefore, in 1970, Congress enacted the FCRA to 
address what it perceived as the “need to insure that consumer 
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with 
fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to 
privacy.”59 To that end, the FCRA’s stated purpose is “to require 
that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures 
  
applicants in the past several years has led to a higher incidence of criminal 
background checks overall. See AP, Employers Post Fewest Job Ads in Five Months, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/ 
2012/11/06/job-ads-september/1685879/ (“With 12.1 million people unemployed in 
September [2012], there were 3.4 unemployed people, on average, competing for each 
open job. In a healthy economy, that ratio is roughly 2-to-1.”). 
 55 Order of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 3, ¶ 3, Ryals 
v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., No.3:09cv625, (E.D. Va. July 7, 2011). 
 56 See, e.g., King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159380 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2012) (class action suit upholding constitutionality of FCRA); Moore v. 
First Advantage Enter. Screening Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136721 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 24, 2012) (dismissing class allegations and allowing individual claims); Farmer v. 
Phillips Agency, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146144 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2012) (denying 
class certification).  
 57 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2006). 
 58 116 CONG. REC. 36570 (1970) (statement of Rep. Sullivan), quoted in 
Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 59 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4). 
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for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, 
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which 
is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the 
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of 
such information.”60 In effect, the FCRA “governs the collection, 
assembly, and use of consumer report information and provides 
the framework for the credit reporting system in the United 
States.”61 Enforcement of the FCRA occurs “at the federal and 
state levels, as well as through private litigation.”62 
To accomplish its goal, the FCRA regulates how CRAs 
compile and distribute consumer reports. Section 1681b lists the 
“[p]ermissible purposes of consumer reports”63 for which a CRA 
“may furnish a consumer report.”64 Use of information contained 
in a consumer report by an employer—the user—to make an 
employment decision about a prospective employee—the 
consumer—is one such “[p]ermissible purpose” under the FCRA.65 
To comply with § 1681b, CRAs must have procedures 
requiring “prospective users of the information [to] identify 
themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is 
sought, and certify that the information will be used for no 
other purpose.”66 When the purpose of a consumer report is to 
make an employment decision, the user is required to provide 
additional certifications before a CRA may furnish a report. 
The employer-user must also certify that a written disclosure 
was made to the consumer,67 that the consumer provided 
written authorization for the procurement of the report,68 and 
that “information from the consumer report will not be used in 
  
 60 Id. § 1681(b). 
 61 FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT 
REPORTING, AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 1 (2011), available 
at http://ftc.gov/os/2011/07/110720fcrareport.pdf [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT]. 
 62 Id. at 3. 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
 64 Id. § 1681b(a). 
 65 Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(B).  
 66 Id. § 1681e(a). CRAs must also “make a reasonable effort” to independently 
verify such certifications from new users. Id. “What constitutes adequate verification 
will vary with the circumstances.” FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 61, at 65. 
Interestingly, according to one FTC Staff opinion letter, the requirements for such 
verification are more lax when a CRA only provides consumer reports that contain 
public records, such as criminal background checks. The staff opinion did not consider 
such information “sensitive personal information, as in a traditional credit report,” and 
therefore advised that simply relying on the client’s certification would satisfy the 
statute. FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of William Haynes (June 9, 1998), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/leblanc.shtm. 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).  
 68 Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
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violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment 
opportunity law or regulation . . . .”69 Additionally, the 
employer-user must certify that “before taking any adverse 
action based in whole or in part on the report, [it will provide 
the consumer with] a copy of the report; and a description in 
writing of the rights of the consumer . . . .”70 
Section 1681c contains the “[r]equirements relating to 
information contained in consumer reports.”71 Because criminal 
records are public information,72 there is no specific federal law 
that prohibits CRAs from providing criminal background 
checks in consumer reports. However, the FCRA does 
temporally restrict CRAs’ ability to include information 
pertaining to criminal records other than criminal 
convictions—e.g., arrests that did not lead to convictions. With 
a few exceptions not relevant to this note, CRAs cannot report 
any arrests that “antedate the report by more than seven 
years . . . .”73 There is, however, no time limit on reporting 
information pertaining to criminal convictions.74 
The general procedures for CRA compliance with the 
FCRA, applicable in all situations, are laid out in § 1681e.75 
Section 1681e(b) states that “[w]henever a consumer reporting 
agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the 
information concerning the individual about whom the report 
  
 69 Id. § 1681b(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 70 Id. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). “There is no specific period of time an employer must 
wait after providing a pre-adverse action notice and before taking adverse action 
against the consumer. Some reasonable period of time must elapse, but the minimum 
length will vary depending on the particular circumstances involved.” FTC STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 61, at 52. The problems inherent in this lack of specificity will be 
discussed in detail, infra Part IV.C.  
 71 15 U.S.C. § 1681c. 
 72 See supra note 4. 
 73 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2). Some states place further limits on the reporting of 
criminal records. In New York, for example, in most instances, a consumer report may 
contain information about an arrest only if it resulted in a criminal conviction or if the 
charges are still pending. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney 2012). 
 74 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5). 
 75 Prior to enactment of the FCRA, a House amendment was accepted that 
extended the requirement to follow reasonable procedures to apply to all CRAs—an 
extension from the original Senate bill that applied this requirement only to CRAs that 
prepared investigative consumer reports. 116 CONG. REC. 35940 (1970) (remarks of 
Sen. Proxmire introducing the conference report), quoted in Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 
F.2d 72, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1982). Additionally, even when subject to the “heightened” 
requirements of § 1681k, a CRA will have to follow § 1681e(b), and the analysis of a 
court will often rest on an interpretation of § 1681e(b). See infra notes 157-61 and 
accompanying text. 
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relates.”76 When CRAs produce consumer reports for employment 
purposes based on public records, they are subject to ostensibly 
heightened compliance requirements under § 1681k. If the report 
is likely to have an adverse effect on an employment decision, 
CRAs must either notify the consumer at the time they send the 
report to the employer or use “strict procedures designed to 
insure that [the report] is complete and up to date.”77 The next 
two parts of this note will explore how courts analyze private 
causes of action alleging violations of these two provisions. 
III. PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 1681E(B) 
Section 1681e(b) is the general compliance provision in 
the FCRA and mandates that “[w]henever a consumer 
reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of 
the information concerning the individual about whom the 
report relates.”78 The FCRA, however, does not impose strict 
liability on CRAs for providing erroneous reports.79 Instead, 
liability can be found if the CRA committed negligent or willful 
violations of this provision.80 Yet litigation of this provision is 
no easy task, because the legislative history of § 1681e(b) is, as 
one Sixth Circuit case called it, “sketchy,”81 and the exact 
standards required by the provision have remained elusive.  
The elements required for proving a negligent violation 
of § 1681e(b) appear simple enough, mirroring the 
requirements for proving a general tort action: 
To succeed on a claim under this section, a plaintiff must establish 
that: (1) the consumer reporting agency was negligent in that it 
failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of its 
credit report; (2) the consumer reporting agency reported inaccurate 
information about the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff was injured; and (4) 
the consumer reporting agency’s negligence proximately caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.82 
Basing their analyses on these elements, courts 
recognize that “[t]he threshold question in a [§] 1681e(b) action 
  
 76 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
 77 Id. § 1681k(a). 
 78 Id. § 1681e(b).  
 79 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that the FCRA “does not make reporting agencies strictly liable for all inaccuracies”).  
 80 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o. 
 81 Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 82 Whelan v. Trans Union Credit Reporting Agency, 862 F. Supp. 824, 829 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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is whether the challenged credit information is inaccurate. If the 
information is accurate no further inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the consumer reporting agency’s procedures is 
necessary.”83 On the other hand, “Whether the credit reporting 
agency followed reasonable procedures ‘will be a jury question in 
the overwhelming majority of cases.’”84 In that way, 
reasonableness, “like other questions concerning the application 
of a legal standard to given facts . . . , is treated as a factual 
question even when the underlying facts are undisputed. It 
therefore cannot be resolved on summary judgment unless the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the procedures is beyond 
question . . . .”85 Proving causation and injury are also questions 
for the jury.86 Thus, a CRA may succeed on a motion for summary 
judgment “only if a court finds, as a matter of law, that a credit 
report was accurate,”87 thereby employing the “accuracy 
defense.”88 But, because the definitions of these elements remain 
unclear, injured consumers struggle to prove their cases. 
A. Accuracy Is Not Defined by the Statute 
The inaccuracy of a consumer report is the threshold 
question in a § 1681e(b) claim, yet the statute provides no 
definition of the term accuracy, and the circuit courts are split 
between two different views on the type of accuracy required by 
the statute.89 This disagreement exists because “[a]ccuracy is 
quite clearly not a self-defining concept, and [the] FCRA’s 
fragmentary legislative history provides little, if any, guidance 
as to how Congress intended this standard to be applied.”90 
  
 83 Houston v. TRW Info. Servs., 707 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing 
Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (stating 
that a “court need not reach the issue of ‘reasonableness’ if it finds initially that the 
report furnished was accurate”)); see also Williams v. LexisNexis Risk Mgmt., No. 
3:06cv241, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62193, at *18 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2007) (stating that 
“when a report is in fact accurate, the procedure is per se reasonable”). 
 84 Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(quoting Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156); see also Guimond v. Transunion Credit Info. Co., 45 
F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The reasonableness of the procedures and whether the 
agency followed them will be jury questions in the overwhelming majority of cases.”). 
 85 Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 86 Adams, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
 87 Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 Id. “This term of art is actually a misnomer because the burden of proving 
that a particular report is inaccurate is part of the plaintiff’s case and not an 
affirmative defense for a defendant credit reporting agency.” Id. at 1156 n.9.  
 89 Id. at 1157.  
 90 Id. 
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One approach to the definition of accuracy—the 
“business friendly interpretation”91—is known as the “technical 
accuracy standard.”92 Under this interpretation, “a credit 
reporting agency satisfies its duty under [§ 1681e(b)] if it 
produces a report that contains factually correct information 
about a consumer that might nonetheless be misleading or 
incomplete in some respect.”93 Courts that adopt the technical 
accuracy standard fear that requiring more would place too 
heavy a burden on CRAs.94  
By contrast, under the “maximum possible accuracy 
approach,”95 also known as the “consumer-friendly 
interpretation,”96 an “entry may be inaccurate within the 
meaning of [§ 1681e(b)] either because it is patently incorrect, 
or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an extent 
that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.”97 
The rationale for this approach is based on statutory 
interpretation and a basic recognition of the FCRA’s purpose. 
Looking at the statute’s language, “[§ 1681e(b)] does not 
require that a consumer reporting agency follow reasonable 
procedures to assure simply that the consumer report be 
  
 91 Neil Vanderwoude, Comment, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Fair for 
Consumers, Fair for Credit Reporting Agencies, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 395, 400 (2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92 Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (citing Holmes v. TeleCheck Int’l, 556 F. Supp. 2d 819, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)). 
 93 Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1157.  
 94 See, e.g., Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (N.D. 
Ala. 2002) (reluctant to place “too great a burden on credit reporting agencies” and 
holding that “[r]equiring ‘technical accuracy’ in credit reports best captures the balance 
Congress struck between consumers’ concern for fair and equitable treatment and 
reporting agencies’ goal of maintaining accurate and cost-effective credit reporting”); 
Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Md. 1992) (“‘Accuracy’ can be tested by 
verification whereas a determination of ‘completeness’ requires the exercise of 
judgment on potentially difficult questions concerning the meaning and effect of 
contextual information.”). In Alexander v. Moore & Associates, the court criticized the 
technical accuracy standard as leading to the result “that a consumer reporting agency 
could report that a person was ‘involved’ in a credit card scam, and without regard to 
[§ 1681e(b)] fail to report that he was in fact one of the victims of the scam.” 553 F. 
Supp. 948, 952 (D. Haw. 1982). However, the Grant court rejected the example given by 
the Alexander court, characterizing it as an “extreme instance[] in which a technically 
accurate statement is so inherently misleading that it would run afoul of the 
‘maximum possible accuracy’ requirement of § 1681e(b).” Grant, 789 F. Supp. at 692. 
The Grant court felt that “the possibility that such extreme cases might be presented 
does not justify rewriting the FCRA to render actionable the initial reporting of 
information which although accurate is deemed to be misleading because it is 
incomplete.” Id. 
 95 Smith, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 433. 
 96 Vanderwoude, supra note 91, at 400.  
 97 Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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accurate, but to assure maximum possible accuracy.”98 Because 
fairness in consumer reporting is one of the stated purposes of 
the FCRA,99 courts have held that § 1681e(b), “fairly read, 
would apply to consumer reports even though they may be 
technically accurate, if it is shown that such reports are not 
accurate to the maximum possible extent.”100 
Whether a court adopts the “technical accuracy 
standard” or the “maximum possible accuracy approach” can 
impact the court’s disposition as to a CRA’s successful use of 
the accuracy defense, and therefore is fundamental to 
determining whether a violation of § 1681e(b) occurred.101 A 
recent case helps to illustrate this point. In Smith v. HireRight, 
the Eastern District court in Pennsylvania denied the 
defendant CRA’s motion to dismiss a claim under § 1681e(b).102 
Smith, the named plaintiff in this class-action suit, had applied 
for several truck-driving positions, and each of his prospective 
employers solicited the defendant, CRA HireRight, to provide 
them with his consumer report.103 Smith had been arrested 
once, a few years earlier, but the consumer report prepared by 
HireRight listed this single incident multiple times.104 In its 
motion to dismiss, HireRight cited a Sixth Circuit case using 
the “technical accuracy standard” to argue that “no claim can 
be stated based on the publication of factually accurate 
information, even if the information was presented in a format 
that created some risk it could be misconstrued by a third 
party.”105 Under this argument, since Smith had been arrested 
on the date reported, the report contained factually correct, 
albeit repeated, information.106 But the court rejected this 
argument and chose to “adopt the maximum accuracy approach 
over the technical accuracy approach.”107 Having adopted this 
  
 98 Alexander, 553 F. Supp. at 952 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2006). 
 100 Alexander, 553 F. Supp. at 952. 
 101 “Although courts have assumed that the so-called ‘accuracy defense’ is a 
question fit for disposition on motion for summary judgment, they have widely 
diverged in their interpretations of what constitutes an ‘accurate’ credit report.” Cahlin 
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 1991).  
 102 Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 103 Id. at 430.  
 104 Id. 
 105 Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Complaint at 3-4, Smith, 711 F. Supp. 2d 426 (No. 09-06007) (citing Holmes 
v. Telecheck Int’l, 556 F. Supp. 2d 819, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)). 
 106 Id. (claiming that “no court has ever held that the mere repetition of 
factually accurate information within a background report renders that report legally 
inaccurate for the purposes of Section 1681e(b)”). 
 107 Smith, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 433 n.5. 
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standard, the court held that Smith had pleaded sufficient facts 
to state a viable cause of action under § 1681e(b) and denied 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.108 Had the case been brought 
in a circuit employing the “technical accuracy standard,” the 
result would likely have been different. 
B. The Statute Provides No Guidance on the Reasonable 
Procedures Required  
While proving that a CRA supplied inaccurate information 
is the threshold question often resolved during the summary 
judgment stage, a plaintiff must still prove the other three 
elements of a § 1681e(b) claim at trial, beginning with showing 
that the CRA was negligent or willful when it failed to use 
reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy. Indeed, as the D.C. 
Circuit stated, “The reasonableness requirement thus severely 
limits an agency’s duty to maximally assure precise and complete 
reporting.”109 The duty imposed by the statute is much like that of 
the standard tort test: it requires the CRA to do “what a 
reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances.”110 
Whether a CRA has satisfied this burden will almost 
always be left up to a jury,111 yet juries are given little guidance 
by the statute or the courts for determining the reasonableness 
of such procedures. As was the case with accuracy, the FCRA 
does not explicitly explain what types of mechanisms would 
constitute reasonable procedures. Some courts explain that 
  
 108 Id. at 438. The court acknowledged that plaintiff’s claim “would not 
necessarily withstand summary judgment scrutiny.” Id. The burden of proving the 
inaccuracy of a report has had the effect of deterring at least some class actions from 
being brought for § 1681e(b) claims. See, e.g., Williams v. LexisNexis Risk Mgmt., No. 
3:06cv241, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62193, at *13 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2007) (“Asserting a 
§ 1681e(b) claim for the entire class would render the class-action device useless, note 
Plaintiffs, because it would require an assessment of whether or not each class 
member’s report was, in fact, inaccurate.”). 
 109 Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This is 
not to imply that CRAs have no duty above merely reporting information that is 
provided to them. See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that the requirement to follow reasonable procedures “requires a consumer reporting 
agency to do more than correctly report the information supplied to it by creditors”). 
Still, a CRA will not be strictly liable for errors contained in a report, assuming it did 
employ reasonable procedures. 
 110 Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (noting 
that “[t]he standard of conduct by which the agency’s action is to be judged is deeply 
rooted in the law of negligence”). Before enacting the FCRA, a House amendment was 
accepted that changed the standard for liability from gross negligence to ordinary 
negligence. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1587 (1970) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4411, 4416, quoted in Bryant, 689 F.2d at 79. 
 111 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
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“[j]udging the reasonableness of an agency’s procedures 
involves weighing the potential harm from inaccuracy against 
the burden of safeguarding against such inaccuracy.”112 But this 
balancing act does little to inform or exemplify. 
Little direction comes from the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). Although tasked with enforcement of the FCRA,113 the FTC 
lacks the authority to establish firm interpretations of its rules.114 
Guidance from an Unofficial FTC Staff Interpretation provides 
scant illumination: “The exact nature of a ‘reasonable procedure’ 
is determined by the circumstances surrounding the operation of 
credit bureau [sic] and may vary from credit bureau to credit 
  
 112 Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 113 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 61, at 3. Under the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010, the FTC now shares its enforcement role with the newly created 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Id. at 1. In August 2012, the FTC 
brought its first enforcement action against a CRA for violations of the FCRA in 
connection with employment background screening. Complaint for Civil Penalties, 
Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, United States v. HireRight Solutions, 
Inc., 12-cv-01313 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023130/ 
120808hirerightcmpt.pdf; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Employment 
Background Screening Company to Pay $2.6 Million Penalty for Multiple Violations of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2012/08/hireright.shtm; Editorial, Accuracy in Criminal Background Checks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/ 
opinion/accuracy-in-criminal-background-checks.html?_r=1&hp. The case, brought against 
CRA HireRight, addressed FCRA violations that may have come to the attention of the 
FTC after a class action suit against the company settled last year. See id.; supra notes 
55, 102-08. The complaint alleged that HireRight violated several provisions of the 
FCRA, including §§ 1681e(b) and 1681k. See HireRight, 12-cv-01313, ¶¶ 21-38. A 
settlement with HireRight, announced the same day the complaint was brought, 
imposed a $2.6 million penalty on the company and permanently enjoined it from 
further violations of the FCRA. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil 
Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief at 3-5, HireRight, 12-cv-
01313, available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023130/120808hirerightstip.pdf.  
 114 “[T]he Commission was specifically denied the power to issue substantive 
rules and regulations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and, therefore, may not 
specify the precise procedures which credit bureaus must follow on an industry-wide 
basis . . . .” Bryant, 487 F. Supp. at 1241-42 (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, UNOFFICIAL 
STAFF INTERPRETATION NO. 162). Regardless, it is not clear how much weight would be 
given to FTC interpretations of the FCRA. The issue of how much deference the courts 
should give to FTC interpretations brings up administrative law issues that are outside 
the scope of this note. For a discussion of those issues, see Amanda L. Fuchs, 
Comment, The Absurdity of the FTC’s Interpretation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s 
Application to Workplace Investigations: Why Courts Should Look Instead to the 
Legislative History, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 339, 347-58 (2001). Unlike the FTC, the CFPB 
was granted rule-making authority over the FCRA, but has yet to use this power in the 
context of employment screening and criminal background checks. See NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 35.  
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bureau.”115 Therefore, the FTC is relegated to “litigate the question 
on a case by case basis.”116 
Litigating reasonableness on such a case-by-case basis 
often reduces the issue to a “battle of . . . witnesses,”117 even 
where the underlying facts of the case are undisputed, causing 
jury confusion and making the outcome of a case unpredictable. 
To illustrate this point, consider the recent case of Adams v. 
National Engineering Service Corp.118 Deborah Adams brought 
an action against CRA National Engineering Services 
Corporation (NESC) after she was denied employment based 
on a consumer report “which inaccurately attributed to [her] 
felony and misdemeanor convictions belonging to a person with 
a different first name . . . [and which] emanated from Virginia, 
a state to which . . . [she] had no connection.”119 The court 
denied NESC’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the 
CRA had clearly reported inaccurate information as “it [was] 
uncontested that the convictions which NESC reported to 
Guidant did not belong to Adams,”120 and that, as to the other 
three elements of a § 1681e(b) claim, a reasonable jury could 
find in Adams’s favor.121 
At trial, the jury found for NESC, and Adams 
subsequently moved for a new trial.122 The court denied her 
motion because, although “the facts of this case were generally 
  
 115 Bryant, 487 F. Supp. at 1241 (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, UNOFFICIAL 
STAFF INTERPRETATION NO. 162). 
 116 Id. at 1242 (quoting UNOFFICIAL STAFF INTERPRETATION NO. 162, supra 
note 115). In the decade following the passage of the FCRA, even the consumer 
reporting industry was unsure of their responsibilities under this provision. An 
industry publication from 1977 stated:  
[Y]ou have some flexibility and the law does not spell out what reasonable 
procedures you must follow. Congress believed that you and the credit granter 
and the consumer would best determine that, and if there was a conflict, the 
courts could decide if the procedure was reasonable. This does not give you the 
license to do anything you please but it recognizes that a procedure may differ 
between credit bureaus, and both procedures may be perfectly acceptable. 
RALPH C. CLONTZ, JR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING MANUAL App. H-113 (rev. ed. 1977), 
quoted in Bryant, 487 F. Supp. at 1242.  
 117 Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., No. 3:07cv1035, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35489, at *6 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2010). 
 118 Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 119 Id. at 333 
 120 Id. at 330. 
 121 Id. (explaining that “a reasonable jury could find that NESC failed to 
follow reasonable procedures,” “that Adams was injured when [her potential employer] 
revoked its contingent offer of employment,” and “that [it] would not have revoked its 
contingent offer but for NESC’s inaccurate attribution of various felony and 
misdemeanor convictions to Adams”).  
 122 Adams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35489, at *3. 
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undisputed . . . , the crux of the jury’s role in this case was to 
determine whether the undisputed actions of [the] defendants 
constituted negligent and/or willful violations of the law.”123 The 
court pointed out that “the distinction between a failure to 
comply with the FCRA and a negligent or willful 
failure . . . was crucial to the case and the presumptive basis 
for the jury’s decision.”124 As the court stated, “The trial 
constituted a battle of the parties’ expert witnesses who 
attempted to define what the parties’ responsibilities were 
under the law.”125 In the absence of guidance as to what 
constitute reasonable procedures under the statute, litigation 
under the FCRA remains unpredictable and difficult for 
consumers to win.  
C. Proving Causation Can Be Very Problematic 
Even if a plaintiff is able to prove to a jury that a CRA 
was negligent or willful in failing to follow reasonable 
procedures under § 1681e(b), she still has to prove the other 
elements in a § 1681e(b) claim—notably that the CRA’s 
negligence proximately caused her injury. To exemplify the 
challenge that this requirement can present, consider the case 
of Obabueki v. Choicepoint.126 Abel Obabueki had been arrested 
for a misdemeanor, and two years after pleading “nolo 
contendere,” his conviction had been “set aside and 
dismissed.”127 When applying for a job at IBM, Obabueki did not 
disclose the conviction on his application, believing that it had 
been expunged from his record and that it could therefore be 
omitted under the directions on the application.128 IBM 
subsequently obtained a consumer report on Obabueki from 
CRA Choicepoint, which “contained information about 
[Obabueki’s] 1995 conviction but did not mention the 1997 
dismissal order.”129 IBM questioned Obabueki about this 
  
 123 Id. at *5-6. 
 124 Id. at *7. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Obabueki v. Choicepoint, 236 F. Supp. 2d 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d sub 
nom. Obabueki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 319 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 127 Id. at 280. Obabueki’s arrest had taken place in California, and the 
“conviction was set aside and dismissed by an order pursuant to California Penal Code 
§ 1204.3.” Id.  
 128 Id. at 280-81. The form directed that “‘arrests without convictions, [and] 
convictions or incarcerations for which a record has been sealed or expunged’ need not 
be included . . . .” Id. at 280 (alteration in original).  
 129 Id. at 281. 
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incident, at which point he provided them with a copy of the 
1997 dismissal order.130 Even after reviewing the dismissal 
order, however, IBM determined that Obabueki had lied on his 
application, and rescinded its offer of employment.131 After 
Obabueki showed the 1997 dismissal order to Choicepoint, 
Choicepoint sent a revised report to IBM which “stated that 
[Obabueki’s] criminal record was ‘clear,’ and made no mention 
of either the 1995 conviction or the 1997 dismissal order.”132 
However, IBM did not reinstate its offer of employment.133 
Obabueki brought an action against Choicepoint, and 
the jury found that Choicepoint had “negligently fail[ed] to 
maintain required procedures designed to ensure the 
completeness and accuracy of its reports.”134 Choicepoint moved 
for judgment as a matter of law, and the court granted its 
motion,135 holding that “the evidence produced at trial . . . did 
not provide a legally sufficient basis for the jury to find as a 
factual matter that [Obabueki’s] injury was proximately caused 
by Choicepoint’s negligence.”136 According to the court, “the 
inaccuracy of the initial report lay in its failure to include the 
1997 dismissal order, not in its failure to report that plaintiff 
had no convictions whatsoever.”137 The court went on to say that 
“although this inaccuracy may have been caused by 
Choicepoint’s negligent failure to maintain procedures 
designed to ensure the accuracy of its reports, the inaccuracy 
was effectively neutralized . . . when plaintiff faxed a copy of 
the 1997 dismissal order to . . . IBM.”138  
  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. Later, when ruling on Choicepoint’s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, the court held that Obabueki had no right to a “clean” report. Id. at 283 (accepting 
Choicepoint’s assertion that “the initial report would have been correct if it had listed 
the 1997 dismissal order along with the 1995 conviction”).  
 133 Id. at 282. 
 134 Id. at 280. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 284. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. The court further stated:  
[A]fter evaluating both the initial Choicepoint report and the 1997 order, IBM 
concluded that [Obabueki] had lied on the [form]. The fact that this conclusion 
was based on IBM’s possibly erroneous interpretation of the legal effect of the 
1997 order is of no consequence to the issue of whether Choicepoint caused 
[Obabueki’s] injury. While Choicepoint may have provided IBM with incomplete 
information regarding [Obabueki], the uncontested evidence offered at trial 
showed that IBM based its decision on information that was complete and 
accurate. Thus, Choicepoint’s negligence—which may have caused the 
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In the court’s eyes, Obabueki lost the job offer because, 
basing its decision on a full and complete record, IBM decided 
that Obabueki had lied. And, as the court pointed out, “the 
FCRA is not a strict liability statute; Choicepoint’s violation of 
the statute does not relieve plaintiff of his burden to establish 
that those violations were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s 
injury.”139 The fact that Choicepoint later determined that 
Obabueki’s record had been expunged, and left it off the report, 
was of no consequence to the court.140 IBM was free to make 
whatever assumptions it wanted about whether his record was 
expunged, even if those assumptions were erroneous. 
IV. HEIGHTENED STANDARDS UNDER § 1681K? DEBUNKING 
THE MYTH 
The preceding part of this note dealt with problems 
associated with litigating a claim under § 1681e(b), which is 
applicable to CRAs in all cases. Recognizing the importance of 
employment decisions and the decisive effect that a 
misreported criminal offense can have on such decisions, 
§ 1681k of the FCRA “deals specifically with consumer reports 
in the employment context and ‘creates heightened standards 
for procedures used to collect information for employment 
purposes.’”141 Under this portion of the FCRA, 
[w]hen a consumer reporting agency furnishes a report that contains 
matters of public record likely to have an adverse effect upon the 
consumer’s ability to obtain employment, it is obligated to do one of 
two things: (1) notify the consumer contemporaneously with the 
transmission of the report to the user or (2) “maintain strict 
procedures” designed to ensure the information is “complete and up 
to date.”142 
Focusing first on the second prong of this test, the 
standard for CRA compliance in the employment context differs 
in two ways from the general requirement found in § 1681e(b): 
(1) the CRA must maintain strict, rather than reasonable, 
procedures, and (2) these procedures must be meant to ensure 
  
production of the initial report—cannot be said to have been the proximate cause 
of IBM’s decision. 
Id. at 285. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 285 n.4. 
 141 Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 438 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (quoting Dalton v. Capital Assoc. Indus., 257 F.3d 409, 417 (4th Cir. 2001)).  
 142 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Dalton, 257 F.3d at 417).  
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that information is complete and up to date, and not just to 
ensure maximum possible accuracy.  
However, these changes may be misleading because, in 
practice, they do not result in any heightened standards at all. 
Section 1681k does not alter the fact that the FCRA is not a 
strict liability statute, and the important “distinction between 
a failure to comply with the FCRA and a negligent or willful 
failure”143 remains. Therefore, to succeed on a § 1681k claim at 
trial, a plaintiff still must prove the same general elements as 
in a § 1681e(b) claim, except that “strict procedures” and 
“complete and up to date” replace “reasonable procedures” and 
“maximum possible accuracy.” Although the standard for 
accuracy presents unique problems in this context,144 courts 
tend to encounter many of the same problems with the “strict 
procedure” standard as they did when defining “reasonable 
procedures.”145 Courts often conflate the two, using reasonable 
procedures as a way to qualify strict procedures.146 When a 
plaintiff loses on reasonable procedures, he will likely lose on 
strict procedures as well.147 And, since a plaintiff must also 
prove that the CRA’s negligence proximately caused his injury, 
many of the problems that were present in § 1681e(b) persist in 
§ 1681k(a)(1), making it hard to see how this provision imposes 
“heightened” requirements at all.  
Turning to the first prong of the test laid out above, 
§ 1681k(a)(1) explicitly offers CRAs a way to “opt-out” of the so-
called “heightened” procedures by providing notice to the 
consumer at the same time as providing a report to an 
employer.148 If the agency contemporaneously provides notice, 
its responsibilities revert back to those under the regular 
§ 1681e(b) requirements.149 Since the notice provides no benefit 
to the consumer,150 § 1681k, as written and as applied, fails to 
create a meaningful form of heightened protection in the 
employment context.  
  
 143 Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., No. 3:07cv1035, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35489, at *7 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2010). 
 144 See infra Part IV.A. 
 145 See infra Part IV.B. 
 146 See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 147 See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. 
 148 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a) (2006). 
 149 See infra note 167. 
 150 See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Accuracy Requirement Is Ineffective 
As for the threshold question of accuracy in the context 
of employment, it would seem that § 1681k(a)(2) eliminates the 
effect of the circuit split as to the definition of accuracy under 
§ 1681e(b).151 Because § 1681k(a)(2) requires that reports be 
complete and up to date, a CRA that reported a criminal record 
but left out a subsequent expungement would be foreclosed 
from using the technical accuracy approach as a defense. The 
language of the statute, however, does not address the fact that 
many court records are inaccurate, and that CRAs may be 
reporting inaccurate information from them. 
According to the statute, reports of public records are 
“considered up to date if the current public record status of the 
item at the time of the report is reported.”152 In Henson v. CSC 
Credit Services,153 the court held that court records are “a 
presumptively reliable source.”154 Therefore, the court held that 
“as a matter of law, a credit reporting agency is not liable 
under the FCRA for reporting inaccurate information obtained 
from a court’s Judgment Docket, absent prior notice from the 
consumer that the information may be inaccurate.”155 The court 
felt that to hold otherwise “would be unduly burdensome and 
inefficient” for CRAs.156 Therefore, although agencies are 
subject to heightened standards in the sense that they must 
ensure that the report reflects the current public records, those 
standards do not actually produce reports with greater 
accuracy overall.  
B. “Strict Procedures” Is Not Defined by the Statute 
Additionally, in § 1681k, the statute changes the 
standard from one requiring reasonable procedures to one 
requiring strict procedures. While the reasonableness of 
procedures follows the standard torts definition, “strict 
procedures” is harder to define, and just like with 
reasonableness, the statute offers no guidance. Because the 
FCRA does not provide a definition, the courts are left to decide 
  
 151 See Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 n.5 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010); see also supra Part III.A.  
 152 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2). 
 153 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 154 Id. at 285.  
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 285-86. 
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what Congress intended. The result is that courts punt the 
question to the jury with very little guidance, using “reasonable 
procedures” as a qualifier, thereby conflating the two 
standards. In Smith, the court simply stated that “[w]ithout an 
extensive analysis of what constitutes ‘strict’ as opposed to 
‘reasonable’ procedures, it stands to reason that ‘strict’ is 
necessarily a more stringent standard.”157 
At the summary judgment stage, when a plaintiff brings 
claims under both § 1681e(b) and § 1681k, courts will usually 
just evaluate the two claims together.158 After finding that a 
report was inaccurate under § 1681e(b), there will almost 
always be a question of fact as to the reasonableness of the 
procedures,159 and courts will, therefore, assume that one exists 
as to the “strictness” of the procedures, as well.160 Ultimately, 
this comes down to the same “battle of the witnesses” that was 
present in § 1681e(b),161 and the result is often the same in both 
cases: if consumers fail to show that the CRA used reasonable 
procedures, they will lose on a claim of strict procedures, as 
well. In this way, the strict procedures required by the statute 
remain unclear and undefined, and the supposed heightened 
requirement that it imposes remains largely unenforced. 
C. Making Matters Worse—Offering CRAs a Way Out 
To top off the frustrations consumers face in § 1681e(b) 
and § 1681k(a)(2), the notice provision of § 1681k(a)(1) 
explicitly offers CRAs a way to “opt-out” of the provisions of 
§ 1681k(a)(2), allowing CRAs to exclusively follow § 1681e(b) 
  
 157 Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 158 See, e.g., Williams v. LexisNexis Risk Mgmt., No. 3:06cv241, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 62193, at *18-19 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2007) (explaining that because the 
Obabueki court was analyzing the adequacy of procedures under the FCRA, the court 
analyzed the § 1681k claims under § 1681e(b)). 
 159 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
 160 See, e.g., Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 319, 332 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (Because it had “already found that there exist[ed] a factual dispute over 
whether NESC followed reasonable procedures, the court necessarily [held] that there 
exist[ed] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it followed strict procedures.”); 
Poore v. Sterling Testing Sys., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 557, 572 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (“Just as 
there is an issue of fact as to whether such reliance and procedures were ‘reasonable’ 
under § 1681e(b), there is an issue of fact as to whether these actions constitute ‘strict’ 
procedures under § 1681k.”); Obabueki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 371, 
399 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (The court approvingly cited Equifax v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 678 F.2d 1047, 1049 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1982), for its recognizing that the 
distinction between reasonable procedures and strict procedures “is clearly not without 
significance,” yet holding that “the disposition of plaintiff’s respective claims under 
these sections are parallel in this case.”). 
 161 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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without providing anything to consumers in return. Therefore, 
rather than imposing heightened standards, this notice 
requirement actually harms consumers without helping to ease 
their burden in litigation. Given that Congress intended to 
create heightened standards in the employment context 
through § 1681k, the inclusion of § 1681k(a)(1) is an enigma. 
Section 1681k applies when a CRA uses public records 
to create a consumer report for employment purposes and the 
information contained therein is likely to have an adverse 
effect.162 The provision mandates that the CRA do one of two 
things: either follow strict procedures to ensure a complete and 
up-to-date report under § 1681k(a)(2), or, 
at the time such public record information is reported to the user of 
such consumer report, notify the consumer of the fact that public 
record information is being reported by the consumer reporting 
agency, together with the name and address of the person to whom 
such information is being reported.163 
Central to understanding this provision is recognizing 
the problem the statute creates by permitting the CRA to 
follow either subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2). Because of that choice, 
stating a valid cause of action for violation of § 1681k “requires 
Plaintiff to plead facts to establish both that: (1) Defendant 
failed to timely notify Plaintiff of the report; and (2) Defendant 
failed to ‘maintain strict procedures designed to insure’ that 
the potentially adverse report is ‘complete and up to date.’”164 
Therefore, failing to comply with the notice provision does not 
create strict liability for the CRA; if a CRA fails to send timely 
notice to the consumer, the consumer still must prove that it 
negligently or willfully violated § 1681k(a)(2).165 Yet a CRA can 
evade the supposedly heightened requirements under 
§ 1681k(a)(2) by providing contemporaneous notice to both the 
consumer and the employer.166 Much like the threshold question 
of accuracy in § 1681e(b) claims, if the CRA provides this notice 
to the consumer, then that ends the § 1681k inquiry; the CRA 
does not have to prove that it followed strict procedures. 
  
 162 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a) (2006). 
 163 Id. § 1681k(a)(1). 
 164 Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 439 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)). 
 165 See, e.g., Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., No. 3:07cv1035, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 35489, at *7 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2010) (stating that “Even if [the CRA’s] notice to 
plaintiff was ‘clearly inadequate,’ as the Court found on summary judgment, it does not 
necessarily follow that [the CRA] was negligent under the law.”). 
 166 Smith, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 438. 
298 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
Instead, its responsibility reverts back to the general 
compliance requirements of § 1681e(b).167 
What makes this so troubling is that the 
contemporaneous notice requirement does not provide any 
meaningful additional protection to the consumer to warrant 
exemption from the heightened standards of § 1681k(a)(2).168 
Contemporaneous notice does not give the consumer an 
opportunity to dispute the contents of the report before the 
potential employer receives it.169 Therefore, “By delaying its 
meaningful accuracy test, the Act allows agencies and 
furnishers a free pass that can be painfully costly to the 
defamed consumer.”170 Thus, the smart CRA would always send 
notice, and thereby avoid having to litigate whether it followed 
strict procedures or not. 
The problems that arise when an employer is the first to 
receive the report demonstrate how this notice mechanism fails 
to provide any benefit to the consumer. As discussed earlier, 
the FCRA places a notice requirement on employers who wish 
to “tak[e] any adverse action based in whole or in part” on 
information contained in consumer reports—the employer must 
“provide . . . the consumer . . . with a copy of the report” before 
taking such adverse action.171 In theory, “The purpose of the 
notification requirement is to allow individuals to contact the 
consumer reporting agency and correct any inaccuracies 
contained in a report, such as incorrect information regarding 
an individual’s arrest or conviction.”172 In light of the way the 
statute is worded, however, this requirement fails to provide 
the consumer any meaningful chance of disputing the record in 
time to remain a realistic candidate for the position.173 
  
 167 See EEOC, Statement of Maneesha Mithal, Meeting of Oct. 20, 2010, 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/mithal.cfm#fn12 (“Regardless 
of whether a CRA chooses to provide the notice or adopt strict procedures, section 
1681e(b) of the FCRA still requires CRAs to have reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy.”). 
 168 It is a well-documented problem with the FCRA that it does not provide 
any form of relief until it is too late. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 
39, at 100-01; Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and 
Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1107 (2007).  
 169 See De Armond, supra note 168, at 1107.  
 170 Id. 
 171 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (2006).  
 172 Lujan, supra note 6, at 59; see also SEARCH, supra note 2, at 60 
(“‘[P]readverse action’ notice is intended to give the consumer the opportunity to review 
the report for accuracy and completeness before the employer makes a final decision.”). 
 173 This appears to be a fundamental flaw in the statute from its very 
inception, related to the remedial nature of the statute. In explaining the requirement 
that an employer provide notice to an employee before taking adverse action—a 
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In Johnson v. ADP,174 plaintiff Eric Johnson ran into this 
very problem. Johnson was denied employment by defendant 
staffing agency RHI based on an erroneous criminal record in a 
consumer report compiled by defendant CRA ADP.175 Initially, 
RHI provided Johnson with a copy of the report and informed 
him that his employment application was being placed on 
hold.176 Fourteen days later, RHI informed Johnson that he was 
no longer being considered as a candidate.177 Johnson sued RHI 
claiming that it violated the FCRA by disqualifying him so soon 
after sending the statutorily required notice, effectively 
denying him an opportunity to dispute the contents of the 
report.178 The FCRA allows CRAs thirty days to investigate 
disputes by consumers.179 Johnson argued that since ADP had 
thirty days to review his report, RHI should have to wait at 
least thirty days before taking adverse action against him.180 
  
requirement that was added by the House conferees prior to the FCRA’s enactment—
then House Representative Sullivan explained,  
The House conferees succeeded in assuring immediate notification to any 
individual, who is rejected for . . . employment because of information in a credit 
report, of the name and address of the agency which made the report on him. 
Thus, his right to access to his file is made more meaningful—he will 
automatically be told where to look for information which may be causing him 
needless harm. The Senate bill would have required the consumer who had been 
rejected for . . . employment because of adverse information in a credit file to 
request, in writing, the name and address of the credit reporting bureau in order 
to check further into the information which may have caused his rejection. 
116 CONG. REC. 36571 (1970) (statement of Rep. Sullivan), quoted in Drury v. TNT 
Holland Motor Express, 885 F. Supp. 161, 165 (W.D. Mich. 1994). This focus on 
allowing consumers to fix their report ex post exemplifies how the consumer cannot 
realistically expect to keep the job offer. And, given the aforementioned inadequacies, 
the FCRA’s protections seem almost meaningless—if a consumer loses one job, then he 
might have a chance for another, but he will almost never know that he does not have a 
clean report until he loses that first job. See De Armond, supra note 168, at 1106. This 
ex-post approach to correcting inaccuracies presents another problem: since “[t]he 
process of evaluating and choosing employees is a subjective, hidden process with no 
oversight[,] . . . the notice requirement is in reality no more than a request that 
employers act in good faith.” Ruth Desmond, Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and 
Privacy in the Employment Context: The Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal 
Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 919 (2010). Additionally, “there is the 
risk that the employer will still be influenced by the record in his employment decision 
and find another ostensible reason not to hire the individual, even if a mistake in the 
record is corrected before the adverse action is taken.” ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, 
supra note 39, at 101. 
 174 768 F. Supp. 2d 979 (D. Minn. 2011). 
 175 Id. at 981. “[T]he criminal records incorrectly list[ed] his race as ‘black.’” 
Id. at 984.  
 176 Id. at 981. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 981, 983.  
 179 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2006). 
 180 Johnson, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
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The court disagreed. Looking to the language of the 
FCRA, the court stated that there is no statutorily 
“mandate[d] . . . waiting period between the notice and the 
adverse action.”181 Still, the court recognized that “Congress’s use 
of the word ‘before’ shows that there must be some time between 
notice and action.”182 However, in what is now a familiar 
problem, the court was left looking at a statute that provided a 
dearth of guidance into exactly how much time “before” would 
satisfy the statutory requirement. Ultimately, the court felt that 
the two weeks that RHI waited between notice and taking 
adverse action satisfied the requirement of the statute.183 
The holding in Johnson shows how consumers are hurt 
when their employer receives a copy of their consumer report 
before they have a chance to review it. In fact, just one week 
after RHI denied Johnson employment, ADP concluded that his 
criminal record had been inaccurate.184 This conclusion was 
reached within the thirty-day window provided to CRAs, but it 
was still too late—RHI had already made its decision. And yet 
RHI had acted, according to the court, completely within its 
mandated requirements. Further, the court stated in its 
holding that “[n]othing in the FCRA requires an employer to 
consider any correction that a reporting agency might make.”185 
Therefore, similar to the problems already shown, once the 
damage had been done by the inaccurate report, nothing could 
be done to fix it. But, if the FCRA is a “remedial statute[],”186 as 
the Johnson court called it, then the statute should actually 
provide some meaningful remedial relief for injured consumers. 
Further, if providing a private right of action under the FCRA 
was intended to be a “part of its enforcement mechanism,”187 
then bringing a private action should induce CRAs to employ 
better practices, something which clearly has not happened.  
V. THE SOLUTION: AMENDING § 1681K 
In light of Congress’s intention for § 1681k to impose 
heightened responsibilities on CRAs, the standards in 
§ 1681k(a)(2) must be enhanced by giving meaning to the 
  
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 984.  
 184 Id. at 981.  
 185 Id. at 984.  
 186 Id. at 983.  
 187 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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requirement of strict procedures and by providing for greater 
accuracy in background checks. Further, the statute should not 
provide CRAs an opportunity to “opt-out” of § 1681k(a)(2) through 
use of the notice provision of § 1681k(a)(1). Modifying this notice 
requirement and incorporating it into § 1681k(a)(2) may provide a 
solution to many of the problems outlined in this note.  
The fact that Congress thought to include a notice 
provision in § 1681k shows that the lawmakers at least 
recognized that the consumer is in the best position to identify 
and fix a mistake in his consumer report. Courts also recognize 
that “[t]he consumer is in a better position than the credit 
reporting agency to detect errors appearing in court documents 
dealing with the consumer’s own prior litigation history.”188 
However, although the right intention exists, the methodology 
is flawed in at least two important ways. First, notifying a 
consumer that a report of his criminal history is being prepared 
will not necessarily move that consumer to request a copy of 
the report. As happens in many cases, information in a 
criminal history report may be completely erroneous, and the 
consumer may not realize that he has any reason to suspect 
errors.189 The consumer may also be motivated by the fear that 
if he delays production of the report to the employer, he will be 
viewed as having something to hide. Second, and most 
important, for such a method to have any meaningful effect on 
employment decisions, the consumer must have the ability to 
inspect and correct the report before a potential employer has 
the opportunity to see it. Providing notice of the report to the 
consumer at the same time the report is supplied to the 
employer fails to provide that protection.  
Therefore, the first step to amending § 1681k is to require 
the CRA to provide the consumer with a copy of the report before 
providing it to the employer.190 A simple way to enforce this would 
  
 188 Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 189 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 39, at 100. 
 190 Noting the problems inherent in the failure of the FCRA to provide a 
consumer with the opportunity to review his criminal record ahead of a prospective 
employer is not a novel observation. See, e.g., De Armond, supra note 168, at 1107. It 
has also been suggested that as a means of consumer protection, “Congress may want 
to consider imposing the requirement of giving consumers the pre-reporting 
opportunity to see the information in all reports of criminal records by consumer 
reporting agencies.” ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 39, at 134. More 
recently, one student writer, aiming to bolster the efficacy of Ohio’s record-sealing 
statute, proposed that Ohio adopt a credit reporting law that would give consumers 
access to their criminal record reports prior to their being provided to prospective 
employers. Jagunic, supra note 2, at 185 (proposing that Ohio “enact credit reporting 
legislation that allows a consumer to dispute inaccurate and out-of-date information 
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be to impose strict liability on CRAs who fail to do so. Congress, 
however, clearly did not intend for the FCRA to create strict 
liability. Instead, the amended § 1681k(a)(1) should be combined 
with § 1681k(a)(2), and prior notice to the consumer should be 
considered a “strict procedure” for ensuring that the report is 
complete and up to date. In this way, the “strict procedures” 
required in § 1681k would have a definition more rigorous than, 
and separate from, the “reasonable procedures” required in 
§ 1681e(b), thereby ameliorating many of the problems found in 
litigation under § 1681k. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that CRAs 
could provide reports to satisfy the reasonable procedure 
requirement of § 1681e(b) in Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau.191 
There, in the context of a credit report that was incomplete, yet 
not erroneous or misleading, the court stated that “the 
likelihood that consumers will be harmed by incomplete reports 
that are neither misleading nor erroneous is less, and in many 
cases it may well be a ‘reasonable procedure’ to let the potential 
creditor supplement the missing information himself.”192 For 
reasons already discussed,193 leaving the responsibility of fixing 
a consumer report in the hands of the employer would not work 
because the consumer is already harmed if the employer views 
an erroneous report. But, using the framework suggested by 
the Koropoulos court, CRAs could satisfy “strict procedures” by 
providing a report to the consumer before showing it to the 
employer. The analogy works as follows: if allowing a potential 
creditor to supplement missing information in a credit report 
could be considered a reasonable procedure for assuring 
maximum possible accuracy under § 1681e(b), then perhaps 
  
before it is provided to a prospective employer”). And, earlier this year, a report by the 
NCLC stated that CRAs should “send the consumer a notice that they intend to report 
the negative information before they send the information to the prospective employer, 
so that incomplete information can be addressed prior to dissemination,” thereby “ensuring 
that records are complete and up-to-date, and no sealed or expunged information is 
provided.” NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 34. 
 191 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 192 Id. at 45. The court reasoned that:  
Imprecise or incomplete reports that are not misleading, although undesirable, 
are not as noxious as erroneous and misleading ones. The potential creditor is 
not misled; he is merely missing information which might be relevant to his 
decision whether to grant credit. Unlike the case of erroneous or misleading 
reports, the potential creditor can often correct inaccuracies himself by asking 
the credit applicants or the source to supply the missing information. 
Id. 
 193 See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.  
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providing a copy of a criminal report to the consumer to verify 
its accuracy could be considered a strict procedure for ensuring 
the report is complete and up to date under § 1681k. 
This approach would benefit both the consumer and the 
CRA. Consumers would have the chance to review their 
purported criminal records before they are given to potential 
employers. CRAs would have a clear example of a compliance 
mechanism that satisfies the strict procedure requirement.  
Employers would most likely oppose this proposition, 
claiming that they will be forced to delay hiring schedules and 
bear added costs. In Johnson, however, the court rejected a 
similar argument by the CRA that a waiting period between 
providing consumers with their reports and taking adverse 
action “would create untenable constraints on employers” by 
pausing their hiring process pending resolution of any 
dispute.194 The court held that the language of the FCRA 
required some waiting period and that the CRA’s position 
would “lead to absurd results.”195 Given that the FCRA was 
enacted to ensure accuracy in the credit reporting industry, it 
would seem that a short delay in the process would not be 
beyond the reach of the statute. Most disputes could be cleared 
up rather quickly, and, at that point, the employer could make 
a well-informed decision based on accurate data. Additionally, 
since the report would have already been created, the cost of 
sending a copy to the consumer first would be minimal.  
CONCLUSION 
Criminal background checks can provide important 
information to potential employers about their prospective 
employees. At the same time, these consumers must be 
protected by ensuring that what their potential employers find 
out about them is accurate and up to date. The FCRA aims to 
regulate the production of consumer reports and places 
requirements on the CRAs that compile information pertaining 
to criminal records. When a consumer is injured because of a 
flawed report, however, the FCRA provides little meaningful 
relief. Having lost an opportunity for employment, the injured 
consumer must then engage in protracted litigation with a low 
chance for success. Additionally, § 1681k of the FCRA—which 
  
 194 Johnson v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 979, 983-84 
(D. Minn. 2011). 
 195 Id. 
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purportedly places heightened standards on CRAs in the context 
of employment—actually only harms consumers, while helping 
the CRAs. Because the requirements under that section are 
inadequately defined, the standard of care required is much the 
same as the general standard of care required under other 
sections of the FCRA. Additionally, CRAs can “opt-out” of the so-
called “heightened” requirements, without giving the consumer 
anything in return. Amending the FCRA by combining the two 
choices in § 1681k can provide a solution to these problems. It 
would give some guidance to courts and juries on the required 
heightened standard of care in the employment context, and it 
would eliminate the ability of CRAs to “opt-out” from 
compliance. Most importantly, it would give the consumer a 
meaningful chance of avoiding injury in the first place. 
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